Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mention/Use: Words are mostly used to mention an object. Words can also be mentioned when the use of language is under discussion. Various logical problems arise from an unconscious use of words while it is unclear whether they are used or mentioned. The confusion of mention and use corresponds to a confusion of words and objects. There are also forms between mention and use. Here we are also presenting different examples for mistaken terms in philosophy, e.g. word and object, description and reality, object language and metalanguage, identity A = A with identity A = B, representation and the thing represented, signifier and the signified object. See also description levels, circularity, identity, use/mention, representation, image, image theory, “aboutness”.See also object Language, metalanguage, quote/disquotation, reference, type/token._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Nelson Goodman on Mistake Mention/Use - Dictionary of Arguments
II 78 Mention/use/possible worlds/possibility/Goodman: statements about what is possible need not exceed the boundaries of the real world. Often we confuse a description of the real world with the world itself. >World/Thinking, >Circular reasoning, >Descriptions, >Metalanguage, >Use, >Mention, >Object language. II 110 Grue/projection: with grue, the description of the desired result is confused with the description of the permitted means. The confirmation is indeed a relationship between data and hypotheses, but that does not mean that the definition of this relationship is likely to use nothing but these data and hypotheses. >Grueness, >Induction, >Hypotheses._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Mistake Mention/Use
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29